ali kiiba
A Magistrate is an honorable citizen, representing the citizens in the legal framework.The Magistrate Shadowing Scheme organised by Operation Black Vote and the Department of Constitutional Affairs, allows Black and other ethnic minority communities to become actively involved in examining the work of local magistrates and applying to sit on the bench. One will learn about Law court proceedings/ penalties/charges and sentences as well as Licensing Laws
- there is a very thorough training offered. Black people should be represented in all key areas of UK Governance and this is a good opportunity
- to ensure it works, be part of it. Offer your unequivocal support with a hands-on approach to problem solving.
I was deeply touched to be nominated as Community Ambassador 2004 and will forever cherish my trophy. I had organised talks, which provided a platform to encourage applications to the magistracy. My aim was to encourage the Ethnic Black Minority members of English society to consider the criminal justice system and improve their confidence by maintaining racial harmony, detaching assertion from aggression and establishing fair justice.
Ethnic Black Minority members of English society were advised to be law-abiding citizens as well as to instill civility and decorum within the youth.
My training and background with the law have been a great asset, as it helped me analyse and evaluate matters clearly. In my community work, I generally try to operate and advise within the framework of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and equal opportunities policies and provide an anti discrimination toolkit to help colleagues. I also found Schedules 1, Articles 2, 9, 10, 14 and 17 of the Human Rights Act 1998 very useful. My aims were to change attitudes, practices that prove detrimental to the advancement of people of colour . These aims were met by my advising on policy issues and raising awareness of any factors that affect them as well as providing a forum for debate and discussions on race issues and spreading best practices using a variety of media tools, ie websites, newsletters, inter-government working groups etc. I have spoken to prison inmates and youth offenders, to have a feel of their thinking, why they re-offend and mitigating circumstances why they engage in crime, misdemeanours and social vices.
I highly recommend the Magistracy to all and have an unshakable faith in OBV endeavours . I stand for justice, I am British and I am Black and proud of all three.
Vernon James Buckle
BME communities break the Judicial ceiling [read story a bove]
Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice, Rt. Hon Jack Straw MP, court officials and magistrates from across the country gathered on Monday at One Whitehall Place, Westminster to celebrate the success of the country’s only Magistrates Shadowing Scheme.
The project aimed at changing the face of the magistracy is already witnessing success both in the numbers of Black and other minority ethnic (BME) magistrates and equally by engendering greater confidence from BME communities in the Judiciary.
Hosted by the Rt. Hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, the Graduation Ceremony recognised the contributions and achievements of the participating courts, shadows and magistrates.
Nearly 40 graduates from the OBV and Ministry of Justice Magistrates Shadowing Scheme have already been appointed as magistrates in cities across the country and a further 200 participants have indicated their desire to apply within the year. Another significant success has been the scheme’s ability to dramatically lower the average age of appointees from the scheme from 57 (average age of magistrate) to 35 (average age of graduate).
A report in January by the Department for Communities and Local Government revealed that the ‘homogenous socio-demographic profile of judges’ was one of the main reasons those from BME backgrounds expected to be discriminated against by our courts.
Referring to the DCLG report, Rt. Hon Jack Straw MP, Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor said, “My concern is that such an expectation, however false it maybe, exists at all. That is where this scheme adds incredible value. By giving people from minority ethnic communities the opportunity to work alongside magistrates, exchange views and share experiences, the Scheme provides a window onto the judiciary and changes perceptions of the court system. Many Shadows no longer view the court system as a ‘them and us’ environment, but rather as an integral part of the wider community. Magistrates are dedicated volunteers who deal with around 95% of all criminal cases. They are the epitome of justice in the community – they are from the community and for the community. And, it is vitally important that magistrates represent the diverse communities they serve. Confidence in the justice system depends on it.”
The year’s scheme has included over 100 BME participants who have spent the last six months shadowing magistrates in courts around the country. The participants (shadows) observed court sessions to learn how magistrates make judgements and arrive at sentencing decisions. Furthermore the important ambassadorial role ensures that many thousands learn about the magistracy, including being encouraged to apply. As part of their ambassadorial role the shadows have informed and inspired tens of thousands of BME individuals about the roles that they too can play within the magistracy.
Noorjahan Begum, a participant from the scheme said, “This was a fantastic scheme which really demystified the justice system and court structures. I particularly enjoyed being a Community Ambassador and want to continue to spread the word. I have applied to become a magistrate and hope that my example will serve to inspire others. “
Round two of Somali reconciliation talks in Djibouti start tomorrow
The second round of talks between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) and the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) is due to open tomorrow [31st May] in Djibouti. The parties had earlier conducted proxy talks in Djibouti under the auspices of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. Although they did not meet face to face, the two sides agreed to take “courageous measures” to resolve the crisis in Somalia by peaceful means. The TFG delegation is expected to number twenty two. President Abdullahi Yusuf is also expected in Djibouti for the opening of the talks, but Prime Minister Nur Hssan ‘Adde’ is not due until next week. The Chairman of the ARS, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, and Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, the former speaker of Parliament, are currently in Yemen , where they met with the President of Yemen and other senior officials today. They are expected in Djibouti tomorrow. The decision of the ARS leaders to attend has led to splits in the Alliance, antagonizing Sheikh Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’, the founder and mentor of the Al-Shabaab terrorist group. Sheikh ‘Aweys’ is not officially a member of the Alliance , but he has announced that the ARS is now planning to strip Sheikh Sharif of his chairmanship. Sheikh ‘Aweys’ has called the Djibouti talks a waste of time. Another who has criticized the talks has been Sheikh Hassan Abdullah ‘Turki’, who like Sheikh ‘Aweys’ has been listed as an associate of Al-Qaeda. Sheikh Hassan ‘Turki’ who is currently in charge of Al-Shabaab terrorists in southern Somalia said the talks in Djibouti would never change anything: “we will defeat Ethiopians, Burundians, Ugandans and the coming UN forces as we defeated the warlords”.
In fact, it appears that a large majority of the ARS supports Sheikh Sharif, and most of the Alliance have now left Eritrea , moving to Djibouti . Sheikh Sharif this week issued a statement blaming Eritrea for the divisions appearing in the Alliance , which was set up in Asmara last September, and asking the Eritrean government to reconsider the “unacceptable position” it had taken. In his statement, Sheikh Sharif also claimed that Ethiopia had a grand ambition to stay in Somalia and that Prime Minister Meles had said in his speech last week that Ethiopia would not withdraw from Somalia . Sheikh Sharif appears to have misunderstood the Prime Minister’s statement. Sheikh Sharif should understand that Ethiopia has dealt with its security concerns and the threat posed by extremist groups a long time ago. It is now in Somalia to help the Somalis to achieve peace and create a conducive security environment for national reconciliation. That is also in the interest of Sheikh Sharif and his colleagues in the ARS. Ethiopia , as the Prime Minister said, is ready to withdraw at any time.
The opposition should now give full consideration to the opportunity created to solve Somalia ’s problems through peaceful means only, and ensure that the ARS will deliver on its commitments and mobilize its supporters to contribute to the implementation of any agreement reached in the talks. The TFG also has to negotiate in good faith, and with utmost flexibility, without undermining the Charter or the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia. Somalia deserves all the support the international community can provide in this endeavor.
The visit of the UN Security Council on June 2-3 underlines the point. The Council's visit, on the first leg of a mission to Sudan , Chad , the Cote d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo, is designed to boost the peace process, to demonstrate its concern and its support for the talks. Council members will be talking to the Somali parties, civil society and other stakeholders. Mr. Ould-Abdallah said it would be a wonderful opportunity for Somali leaders to show their strong commitment and determination to restore peace and stability to Somalia . The Special Representative said he had been extremely encouraged by the progress made so far, and the huge support the process had received from Somalis inside and outside the country. “Both the Government and the opposition have shown their unwavering patriotic commitment to reconciliation”. Earlier, Mr. Ould-Abdallah had accused the international media of distorting facts and information from Somalia to further the agenda of those who did not want to see peace return to the country. Making a plea to the media to stop reporting issues that would be controversial, he stressed that the priority was peace.
Ethiopia’s Charities and Societies draft law: the Prime Minister meet NGOs
The enacting of basic legislation in Ethiopia usually requires a lengthy participatory process of consultation with stake holders and all those affected by the proposed legislation. Once a text is produced it is discussed and stakeholders consulted at the initial stage or when the first version of the draft law is ready. The consultation begins at an early stage but continues while the legislation passes through the Council of Ministers and when it goes to the House of Peoples’ Representatives. The House of Representatives also consults with stakeholders after public announcements are made to give advance notice of the dates for a public hearing. All interested parties are invited to submit written comments and attend the hearing.
The Draft Proclamation on Charities and Societies is undergoing this participatory process of consultation.
The first of these consultations was held between representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Ethiopia and a team from the Ministry of Justice led by the Minister. In a second meeting, NGO representatives met with the Prime Minister. These forums provided ample opportunities for civil society organizations to air their concerns about the Draft Proclamation and offer suggestions. The meetings, in particular the one held with the Prime Minister, were also intended to dispel misconceptions about the Government’s intentions. During the consultations, it was explained that religious institutions, trade unions and employers’ associations, and neighborhood traditional self-help associations like the Idir, are not covered by the draft Proclamation. Religious freedom is fully guaranteed by the FDRE Constitution and the draft law does not in anyway affect this freedom in terms of free exercise of religion. The main focus of the meeting with the Prime Minister was on constitutional issues.
During the discussion the Prime Minister explained that NGOs are either established in Ethiopia under the laws of Ethiopia or they are established abroad. Organizations do not, of course, enjoy nationality rights as such. NGOs can be incorporated under this or that country’s laws but cannot have nationality in the way individuals do. NGOs are therefore either established in Ethiopia under the laws of Ethiopia , or registered abroad. The draft law envisages they may be established in Ethiopia and yet be considered foreign based if they obtain all financing from abroad. The Prime Minister emphasized that there was no reason for the concern expressed that the draft law could mean an end to an NGO’s operations or an end to continued financing from abroad for such local organizations. The legal and institutional framework provided under the draft legislation is quite consistent with the FDRE Constitution guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. The text is equally consistent with the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of every person to freedom of association for any cause and purpose. In fact the draft law provides an enabling legal framework envisaged by the Constitution, similar to that provided in the law on political parties, where the right to associate is fully guaranteed but they are not allowed to receive foreign funding. In other words, NGOs fully financed by foreign contribution will not be prohibited from operating or incorporating in Ethiopia but will be considered as foreign based. The only restriction is that they cannot engage in certain, very limited activities, reserved for citizens, as is the case in all countries.
Another meeting is scheduled shortly between the Prime Minister and the NGO representatives. This is expected to focus on ideas and suggestions that civil society organizations might bring to the discussion on the structure and design of the draft law. Predictably, perhaps, some quarters have ascribed a repressive intention to the Government. This is typical of those who thrive on disseminating false information about any such Government initiatives. The fact is that the draft law is an enabling legislation. It starts with the premise that civil society organizations are member-based and member-financed. Decision making is fully controlled by members. It provides accountability for finance and for the organization’s activities. It also allows for judicial and administrative oversight and due process. The ongoing consultations and the normal legislative process will further develop the Draft Proclamation. Efforts to misrepresent it do not help anybody.
An AU fact finding mission to Djibouti and Eritrea
On April 24th the Government of Djibouti formally brought the issue of Eritrean incursions in the Ras Doumeira area of Djibouti to the attention of the African Union Peace and Security Council. The Government of Djibouti asked for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission. Since then the issue of tension along the common border between Djibouti and Eritrea has been on the agenda of the Peace and Security Council. The Council has deliberated on the issue on three occasions. It has also been trying to get relevant information from the two parties about the problem. At the second meeting, on May 2nd, the Council encouraged the African Union Commission to remain in close contact with both countries and to monitor the evolution of the situation, with the view to taking any action that would be deemed appropriate, including the dispatch, in due course, of a mission to assess the situation on the ground. Following this, the Council convened its 129th meeting on 26 May, to discuss the issue further. It was briefed by the Commission about developments. The Council then decided to send a fact-finding mission as soon as possible. The mission will be composed of military experts, lawyers, diplomats and topographers. It will be sent before mid June 2008. The findings of the mission will provide the basis for detailed deliberation and discussion, and for any further action by the Peace and Security Council.
Another step towards Union Government
The Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government, established by a decision of the January/February 2008 AU Summit to consider the issue of the Union Government, met in Arusha, May 22nd and 23rd. It successfully concluded its meeting with the adoption of a series of concrete recommendations aimed at accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the [African] continent. Although there has been a general agreement on the need for an integrated continent since 2002, the path to be pursued to accelerate political and socio-economic integration has been more controversial. Two approaches have been proposed, one advocating a gradual and realistic approach. The other has argued for the immediate establishment of a continental government. To try to bridge the difference, two Committees of Heads of State and Government were created. One led by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda was set up by the January 2005 Summit in Abuja; the other led by the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo was set up at the July 2005 Summit of Sirte. In addition a Ministerial Committee was established by a decision of the July 2007 Summit in Accra . None of these were able to reach a consensus on the approach to Union Government or on a number of other key issues. As a result the matter was referred to the present Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government. The Committee of Twelve comprises of Tanzania and Ghana as current and immediate past Chairpersons of the Union as well as Botswana , Cameroon , Gabon , Egypt , Ethiopia , Libya , Nigeria , Senegal , South Africa and Uganda . Its mandate is to consider the Report of the Executive Council (Ministers of Foreign Affairs) on the Union Government and the Audit of the African Union and submit appropriate recommendations to the next meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sharm El Sheik ( Egypt ) in July 2008.
The Committee meeting on May 22/23 was attended at the Heads of State and Government level by Tanzania , South Africa , Nigeria , Uganda and Ethiopia . It unambiguously affirmed that the form of the Union Government is a union of independent and sovereign States to be created on a gradual basis, and that the accelerators and benchmarks identified by the High Level Panel, which conducted the Audit of the African Union, should be implemented. These accelerators and benchmarks include the free movement of peoples across borders as laid out in the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act, the development of transcontinental and inter-regional infrastructure, the development of multinational African firms, the early establishment of continental financial institutions, the popularization and internalization of the core values underpinning the Constitutive Act, the engagement and mobilization of the peoples of Africa, the rationalization of Regional Economic Communities as building blocks of the Union, and the fast-tracking of the move towards an African Common Market and the African Economic Community. The Committee also agreed that there are issues of strategic importance, which could be handled at the continental level on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. These include such items as continent-wide poverty reduction strategies, free movement of persons, goods and services, inter-regional and continental infrastructure, environmental issues, epidemics and pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, research/university centers of excellence, international trade negotiations, peace and security and transnational crimes. They also agreed that the African Union Organs, particularly the Commission, should be strengthened. The Committee will now submit its recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sharm El Sheik.
Ethiopia isn’t breaking the Somali arms embargo
Last week, we raised doubts about claims by the UN Monitoring Group in its Report of April 24th, that Ethiopian and AMISOM troops had been supplying Somali arms markets with weapons and ammunition. In commenting on the Report, the Chairman of the Security Council's Somali Sanctions Committee even claimed that Ethiopian and TFG troops were supplying 80 percent of the ammunition available in the market. This figure was not supported by the Report, and the Chairman had no basis for making the comment. Referring to arms and ammunition reaching the Bakaraaha Arms Market, and other similar smaller markets, the Monitoring Group claimed Ethiopian troops were selling some of their own arms and that some Ethiopian supplies to the TFG forces ended up in the arms markets. The evidence that the Monitoring Group produced, however, was minimal. It consisted of one apparent action, in October last year, when two 4 x 4 vehicles with ammunition and weapons were allegedly diverted to the arms market at Hurwia. This incident is under investigation. The allegations against AMISOM forces also appear limited to one single incident when arms and ammunition apparently disappeared from a storage facility under AMISOM control. The Ugandan Chief of Staff promised an immediate investigation when the matter was brought to the attention of AMISOM commanders. The Head of the AU Conflict Management Division also said he had asked for an investigation. There is of course no doubt that significant quantities of arms and ammunition do still pass through the arms markets in and around Mogadishu . It would be absurd to pretend that occasional losses may not occur, from Ethiopian troops, AMISOM forces or from stockpiles of captured weapons. It is equally absurd to suggest that this sort of action is taking place on the scale suggested by the Monitoring Group, or that either Ethiopian or Ugandan troops are arming their opponents. Any soldier found without his weapon would immediately be court-martialed. A spokesman for AMISOM this week said “I can assert that none of the AMISOM commanders is involved in any form of arms trafficking.” Most of the evidence in the Report actually indicates that the arms supplies reaching the arms markets and the forces of the former ICU or the terrorists of Al-Shabaab are actually coming from external sources, largely Eritrea or from further afield.
In its opening summary, the Monitoring Group also makes a number of exaggerated assertions about the situation in Somalia during the period of its report, October 2007 to April 2008. In these seven months, opposition groups have not gained control of more territory, or indeed of any territory, nor have they limited the deployment of TFG forces or those of Ethiopian government forces. Neither TFG nor Ethiopian forces have been “losing ground” to insurgents, and TFG security forces have not been fragmenting. Ethiopian forces have not, as the Report, claims sent reinforcements into Somalia recently nor have they regrouped and abandoned smaller bases in the face of successful Al-Shabaab attacks. Following a series of successful Ethiopian and TFG operations in Mogadishu , Al-Shabaab have been largely forced out of the city. Ethiopian forces have redeployed into other towns to continue the pressure on Al-Shabaab. Despite its own protestations, Al-Shabaab has suffered a number of serious setbacks in the last few months, losing significant numbers of fighters in several clashes. Similarly, there is no evidence, other than opposition claims, that the TFG military, intelligence and police forces are pursuing different goals, as the Report claims, or that they have fought each other. Here, as in some other areas, the Monitoring Group does not appear to have made any attempt to evaluate the credibility of its sources with any care. As we have pointed out before, they are not alone in this.
It is true that the insurgents have bases in Somalia , and they acquire most of their arms, but not all, by sea, but it is simply repeating the propaganda of Al-Shabaab or the ICU to suggest that these groups “have systematically increased their control over the territory of Somalia ”. They have not, indeed, quite the reverse. In recent months they have been losing ground. The Monitoring Group failed to note the very considerable successes achieved against Al-Shabaab in recent months, by TFG and Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu . The recent death of the Al-Shabaab commander, Aden Hashi 'Ayro', occurred after the Report was completed, but the decline in support for Al-Shabaab can be gauged by the fact that it was his own clansmen who pinpointed the position of 'Ayro' for the US air strike which killed him and a number of other senior Al-Shabaab commanders. In this context, Al-Shabaab and the former ICU, now the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), no longer organize joint combat operations or share weapons and fighters, if indeed they ever did. Al-Shabaab, compared to the ICU/ARS’s internal Somali agenda, has an entirely different external and terrorist agenda. The attempts by Al-Shabaab's mentor, Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' to control the ARS in recent weeks and prevent any involvement in the Djibouti talks about reconciliation, emphasizes the differences between the two. It might be remembered that Sheikh 'Aweys' as chairman of the shura in Mogadishu in 2006 was largely responsible for bringing the Khartoum talks to a rapid and premature end.
The main criticism to be made of the Report, however, is that the Monitoring Group for the first time has suddenly decided to see the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia as a violation of the arms embargo. It even claims Ethiopian air force flights supplying Ethiopian troops in Somalia violate the embargo. This view is not sustainable. Ethiopian forces are in Somalia at the request of the Government of Somalia and in support of the Government of Somalia's efforts to suppress insurgency and terrorist operations. They are playing a major role in protecting the AU force, AMISOM, which is there under international auspices and indeed under UN agreement. The Monitoring Group even tries to classify Ethiopia 's supply of weapons and ammunition to the Somali national army as a violation despite the partial lifting of the embargo to allow for AMISOM supply and support to the Somali security forces. Ethiopia , of course, also provides training to Somali security forces. There has been training for police and anti-terrorist training for Somali army troops in Ethiopia . Ethiopia makes no secret of this or for its training for a thousand police and another nine hundred protection officers. Indeed, Ethiopia prides itself on the support it is giving to the Government of Somalia in its struggle against terrorists and insurgents who are backed by Eritrea as indeed the Monitoring Group has noted in very substantial detail in this and in previous reports. In the light of international acceptance of the presence of AMISOM, and of Ethiopia ’s associated role, Ethiopia ’s actions cannot even be regarded as technical violations of the arms embargo. The comparison with the deliberate and open violations committed by Eritrea in its support for Al-Shabaab and Somali opposition forces, about which the Chairman of the Committee said nothing, is marked.
During the discussion the Prime Minister explained that NGOs are either established in Ethiopia under the laws of Ethiopia or they are established abroad. Organizations do not, of course, enjoy nationality rights as such. NGOs can be incorporated under this or that country’s laws but cannot have nationality in the way individuals do. NGOs are therefore either established in Ethiopia under the laws of Ethiopia , or registered abroad. The draft law envisages they may be established in Ethiopia and yet be considered foreign based if they obtain all financing from abroad. The Prime Minister emphasized that there was no reason for the concern expressed that the draft law could mean an end to an NGO’s operations or an end to continued financing from abroad for such local organizations. The legal and institutional framework provided under the draft legislation is quite consistent with the FDRE Constitution guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms. The text is equally consistent with the provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of every person to freedom of association for any cause and purpose. In fact the draft law provides an enabling legal framework envisaged by the Constitution, similar to that provided in the law on political parties, where the right to associate is fully guaranteed but they are not allowed to receive foreign funding. In other words, NGOs fully financed by foreign contribution will not be prohibited from operating or incorporating in Ethiopia but will be considered as foreign based. The only restriction is that they cannot engage in certain, very limited activities, reserved for citizens, as is the case in all countries.
Another meeting is scheduled shortly between the Prime Minister and the NGO representatives. This is expected to focus on ideas and suggestions that civil society organizations might bring to the discussion on the structure and design of the draft law. Predictably, perhaps, some quarters have ascribed a repressive intention to the Government. This is typical of those who thrive on disseminating false information about any such Government initiatives. The fact is that the draft law is an enabling legislation. It starts with the premise that civil society organizations are member-based and member-financed. Decision making is fully controlled by members. It provides accountability for finance and for the organization’s activities. It also allows for judicial and administrative oversight and due process. The ongoing consultations and the normal legislative process will further develop the Draft Proclamation. Efforts to misrepresent it do not help anybody.
An AU fact finding mission to Djibouti and Eritrea
On April 24th the Government of Djibouti formally brought the issue of Eritrean incursions in the Ras Doumeira area of Djibouti to the attention of the African Union Peace and Security Council. The Government of Djibouti asked for the dispatch of a fact-finding mission. Since then the issue of tension along the common border between Djibouti and Eritrea has been on the agenda of the Peace and Security Council. The Council has deliberated on the issue on three occasions. It has also been trying to get relevant information from the two parties about the problem. At the second meeting, on May 2nd, the Council encouraged the African Union Commission to remain in close contact with both countries and to monitor the evolution of the situation, with the view to taking any action that would be deemed appropriate, including the dispatch, in due course, of a mission to assess the situation on the ground. Following this, the Council convened its 129th meeting on 26 May, to discuss the issue further. It was briefed by the Commission about developments. The Council then decided to send a fact-finding mission as soon as possible. The mission will be composed of military experts, lawyers, diplomats and topographers. It will be sent before mid June 2008. The findings of the mission will provide the basis for detailed deliberation and discussion, and for any further action by the Peace and Security Council.
Another step towards Union Government
The Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government, established by a decision of the January/February 2008 AU Summit to consider the issue of the Union Government, met in Arusha, May 22nd and 23rd. It successfully concluded its meeting with the adoption of a series of concrete recommendations aimed at accelerating the political and socio-economic integration of the [African] continent. Although there has been a general agreement on the need for an integrated continent since 2002, the path to be pursued to accelerate political and socio-economic integration has been more controversial. Two approaches have been proposed, one advocating a gradual and realistic approach. The other has argued for the immediate establishment of a continental government. To try to bridge the difference, two Committees of Heads of State and Government were created. One led by President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda was set up by the January 2005 Summit in Abuja; the other led by the former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo was set up at the July 2005 Summit of Sirte. In addition a Ministerial Committee was established by a decision of the July 2007 Summit in Accra . None of these were able to reach a consensus on the approach to Union Government or on a number of other key issues. As a result the matter was referred to the present Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government. The Committee of Twelve comprises of Tanzania and Ghana as current and immediate past Chairpersons of the Union as well as Botswana , Cameroon , Gabon , Egypt , Ethiopia , Libya , Nigeria , Senegal , South Africa and Uganda . Its mandate is to consider the Report of the Executive Council (Ministers of Foreign Affairs) on the Union Government and the Audit of the African Union and submit appropriate recommendations to the next meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sharm El Sheik ( Egypt ) in July 2008.
The Committee meeting on May 22/23 was attended at the Heads of State and Government level by Tanzania , South Africa , Nigeria , Uganda and Ethiopia . It unambiguously affirmed that the form of the Union Government is a union of independent and sovereign States to be created on a gradual basis, and that the accelerators and benchmarks identified by the High Level Panel, which conducted the Audit of the African Union, should be implemented. These accelerators and benchmarks include the free movement of peoples across borders as laid out in the Abuja Treaty and the Constitutive Act, the development of transcontinental and inter-regional infrastructure, the development of multinational African firms, the early establishment of continental financial institutions, the popularization and internalization of the core values underpinning the Constitutive Act, the engagement and mobilization of the peoples of Africa, the rationalization of Regional Economic Communities as building blocks of the Union, and the fast-tracking of the move towards an African Common Market and the African Economic Community. The Committee also agreed that there are issues of strategic importance, which could be handled at the continental level on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. These include such items as continent-wide poverty reduction strategies, free movement of persons, goods and services, inter-regional and continental infrastructure, environmental issues, epidemics and pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, research/university centers of excellence, international trade negotiations, peace and security and transnational crimes. They also agreed that the African Union Organs, particularly the Commission, should be strengthened. The Committee will now submit its recommendations to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Sharm El Sheik.
Ethiopia isn’t breaking the Somali arms embargo
Last week, we raised doubts about claims by the UN Monitoring Group in its Report of April 24th, that Ethiopian and AMISOM troops had been supplying Somali arms markets with weapons and ammunition. In commenting on the Report, the Chairman of the Security Council's Somali Sanctions Committee even claimed that Ethiopian and TFG troops were supplying 80 percent of the ammunition available in the market. This figure was not supported by the Report, and the Chairman had no basis for making the comment. Referring to arms and ammunition reaching the Bakaraaha Arms Market, and other similar smaller markets, the Monitoring Group claimed Ethiopian troops were selling some of their own arms and that some Ethiopian supplies to the TFG forces ended up in the arms markets. The evidence that the Monitoring Group produced, however, was minimal. It consisted of one apparent action, in October last year, when two 4 x 4 vehicles with ammunition and weapons were allegedly diverted to the arms market at Hurwia. This incident is under investigation. The allegations against AMISOM forces also appear limited to one single incident when arms and ammunition apparently disappeared from a storage facility under AMISOM control. The Ugandan Chief of Staff promised an immediate investigation when the matter was brought to the attention of AMISOM commanders. The Head of the AU Conflict Management Division also said he had asked for an investigation. There is of course no doubt that significant quantities of arms and ammunition do still pass through the arms markets in and around Mogadishu . It would be absurd to pretend that occasional losses may not occur, from Ethiopian troops, AMISOM forces or from stockpiles of captured weapons. It is equally absurd to suggest that this sort of action is taking place on the scale suggested by the Monitoring Group, or that either Ethiopian or Ugandan troops are arming their opponents. Any soldier found without his weapon would immediately be court-martialed. A spokesman for AMISOM this week said “I can assert that none of the AMISOM commanders is involved in any form of arms trafficking.” Most of the evidence in the Report actually indicates that the arms supplies reaching the arms markets and the forces of the former ICU or the terrorists of Al-Shabaab are actually coming from external sources, largely Eritrea or from further afield.
In its opening summary, the Monitoring Group also makes a number of exaggerated assertions about the situation in Somalia during the period of its report, October 2007 to April 2008. In these seven months, opposition groups have not gained control of more territory, or indeed of any territory, nor have they limited the deployment of TFG forces or those of Ethiopian government forces. Neither TFG nor Ethiopian forces have been “losing ground” to insurgents, and TFG security forces have not been fragmenting. Ethiopian forces have not, as the Report, claims sent reinforcements into Somalia recently nor have they regrouped and abandoned smaller bases in the face of successful Al-Shabaab attacks. Following a series of successful Ethiopian and TFG operations in Mogadishu , Al-Shabaab have been largely forced out of the city. Ethiopian forces have redeployed into other towns to continue the pressure on Al-Shabaab. Despite its own protestations, Al-Shabaab has suffered a number of serious setbacks in the last few months, losing significant numbers of fighters in several clashes. Similarly, there is no evidence, other than opposition claims, that the TFG military, intelligence and police forces are pursuing different goals, as the Report claims, or that they have fought each other. Here, as in some other areas, the Monitoring Group does not appear to have made any attempt to evaluate the credibility of its sources with any care. As we have pointed out before, they are not alone in this.
It is true that the insurgents have bases in Somalia , and they acquire most of their arms, but not all, by sea, but it is simply repeating the propaganda of Al-Shabaab or the ICU to suggest that these groups “have systematically increased their control over the territory of Somalia ”. They have not, indeed, quite the reverse. In recent months they have been losing ground. The Monitoring Group failed to note the very considerable successes achieved against Al-Shabaab in recent months, by TFG and Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu . The recent death of the Al-Shabaab commander, Aden Hashi 'Ayro', occurred after the Report was completed, but the decline in support for Al-Shabaab can be gauged by the fact that it was his own clansmen who pinpointed the position of 'Ayro' for the US air strike which killed him and a number of other senior Al-Shabaab commanders. In this context, Al-Shabaab and the former ICU, now the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), no longer organize joint combat operations or share weapons and fighters, if indeed they ever did. Al-Shabaab, compared to the ICU/ARS’s internal Somali agenda, has an entirely different external and terrorist agenda. The attempts by Al-Shabaab's mentor, Sheikh Hassan Dahir 'Aweys' to control the ARS in recent weeks and prevent any involvement in the Djibouti talks about reconciliation, emphasizes the differences between the two. It might be remembered that Sheikh 'Aweys' as chairman of the shura in Mogadishu in 2006 was largely responsible for bringing the Khartoum talks to a rapid and premature end.
The main criticism to be made of the Report, however, is that the Monitoring Group for the first time has suddenly decided to see the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia as a violation of the arms embargo. It even claims Ethiopian air force flights supplying Ethiopian troops in Somalia violate the embargo. This view is not sustainable. Ethiopian forces are in Somalia at the request of the Government of Somalia and in support of the Government of Somalia's efforts to suppress insurgency and terrorist operations. They are playing a major role in protecting the AU force, AMISOM, which is there under international auspices and indeed under UN agreement. The Monitoring Group even tries to classify Ethiopia 's supply of weapons and ammunition to the Somali national army as a violation despite the partial lifting of the embargo to allow for AMISOM supply and support to the Somali security forces. Ethiopia , of course, also provides training to Somali security forces. There has been training for police and anti-terrorist training for Somali army troops in Ethiopia . Ethiopia makes no secret of this or for its training for a thousand police and another nine hundred protection officers. Indeed, Ethiopia prides itself on the support it is giving to the Government of Somalia in its struggle against terrorists and insurgents who are backed by Eritrea as indeed the Monitoring Group has noted in very substantial detail in this and in previous reports. In the light of international acceptance of the presence of AMISOM, and of Ethiopia ’s associated role, Ethiopia ’s actions cannot even be regarded as technical violations of the arms embargo. The comparison with the deliberate and open violations committed by Eritrea in its support for Al-Shabaab and Somali opposition forces, about which the Chairman of the Committee said nothing, is marked.
